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Abstract
When the scientific method yields discoveries that imperil people’s lifestyle or worldviews or impinge on corporate vested
interests, the public and political response can be anything but favorable. Sometimes the response slides into overt denial of
scientific facts, although this denial is often claimed to involve “skepticism”. We outline the distinction between true skepticism
and denial with several case studies. We propose some guidelines to enable researchers to differentiate legitimate critical
engagement from bad-faith harassment, and to enable members of the public to pursue their skeptical engagement and critique
without such engagement being mistaken for harassment.
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When scientists discover a planet in our Milky Way that is made entirely of diamonds (Bailes et al., 2011), public
fascination and admiration are virtually assured. Most people revel in the idea, however remote, that one day we
might own a chunk of that scientific discovery. By contrast, when the same scientific method yields discoveries
that are closer to home but that touch on people’s lifestyle or worldviews, or that impinge on corporate vested in-
terests, the public response can be anything but favorable.
The controversy surrounding climate change is just one example of a polarized public debate that seems remote
and detached from the actual state of science: Within the scientific community, there is a pervasive consensus
that the Earth is warming from greenhouse gas emissions (Anderegg, Prall, Harold, & Schneider, 2010; Cook et
al., 2013; Doran & Zimmerman, 2009; Oreskes, 2004; Shwed & Bearman, 2010), but outside science there is
entrenched denial of this fact in some sectors of society (e.g., Dunlap, 2013; Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Oberauer,
2013). Media reports occasionally even proclaim that warming has stopped (Ridley, 2014) or that we are heading
for global cooling (e.g., Rose, 2013). Those propositions have no scientific support but they may be welcome
news to a public concerned about the potential impact of climate mitigation on their lifestyles.
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What characterizes the public response to scientific discoveries that are “inconvenient”, or threatening to one’s
lifestyle, livelihood, or deeply-held beliefs? Is it debate, denial, or skepticism? And what options, if any, are there
for the public to enter a scientific debate? How can scientists facilitate debate but resist denial? We address those
questions in three ways: We first describe the tools of politically-inspired denial. We then report a case study that
illustrates the path by which skeptical members of the public are able to contribute to science. We conclude by
underscoring the need for scientists to be transparent and to respond to legitimate public concerns, and how the
triage between denial and skepticism can be achieved.
Public Debate Versus Denial
Public debate and skepticism are essential to a functioning democracy. Indeed, skepticism has been shown to
enable people to differentiate more accurately between truth and falsehood (e.g., Lewandowsky, Stritzke, Oberauer,
& Morales, 2005, 2009). However, when medical researchers who investigate the adverse health effects of tobacco
are accused of being a “cartel” that “manufactures alleged evidence” (Abt, 1983, p. 127), or when climate change
is labelled a “hoax” that is ostensibly perpetrated by corrupt scientists (Inhofe, 2012), or when an American corporate
front group likens climate scientists to the Unabomber (an American anarchist convicted of terrorism) in a billboard
campaign (Zwick, 2012), then those statements are more indicative of the denial of scientific facts than expressions
of skepticism (Diethelm & McKee, 2009; Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Oberauer, 2013; Lewandowsky, Oberauer, &
Gignac, 2013; McKee & Diethelm, 2010).
The dividing line between denial and skepticism may not always be apparent to the public, but existing research
permits its identification with relative ease because denial expresses itself with considerable homogeneity irre-
spective of which scientific fact is being targeted (Diethelm & McKee, 2009; McKee & Diethelm, 2010; Oreskes
& Conway, 2010). For example, denial commonly invokes notions of conspiracies (Lewandowsky, Cook, et al.,
2015; Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Oberauer, 2013; Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Gignac, 2013; Mann, 2012). Con-
spiratorial content is widespread in anti-vaccination material on the internet (Briones, Nan, Madden, & Waks,
2012; Zimmerman et al., 2005) as well as on blogs that deny the reality of climate change (Lewandowsky, Cook,
et al., 2015). HIV-AIDS denial frequently invokes the claim that AIDS was created by the U.S. Government (Bog-
art & Thorburn, 2005; Kalichman, 2009; Nattrass, 2010); and a U.S. Senator has authored a book entitled The
Greatest Hoax: How the Global Warming Conspiracy Threatens Your Future (Inhofe, 2012). Attributes such as
“hoax” or “biggest scam in the world to date” also make up the largest share of affective responses by people who
reject climate science when they are asked to provide the first word or image that comes to mind in connection
with global warming (Smith & Leiserowitz, 2012). Not surprisingly, therefore, the involvement of conspiracism in
climate denialist discourse has been affirmed by a blind test (Lewandowsky, Cook, et al., 2015).i
A second common feature of denial, which differentiates it further from skepticism and legitimate debate, involves
personal and professional attacks on scientists both in public and behind the scenes. The fact that scientists
working in the climate arena receive abusive mail and threats has already attracted much public attention (e.g.,
Lewandowsky, Mann, Bauld, Hastings, & Loftus, 2013; Mann, 2012; Powell, 2011). To illustrate, the first two authors
(S.L. and M.M.) have been variously accused of “mass murder and treason” or have received email from people
who wanted to see them “six feet under.” Less well known is the fact that such correspondence is unlikely to be
random: Abusive mail tends to peak after the posting of scientists’ email addresses on certain websites run by
political operatives.
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Those public attacks are often paralleled by prolific complaints to scientists’ host institutions with allegations of
research misconduct. The format of such complaints ranges from brief enraged emails to the submission of detailed
multi-page dossiers, typically suffused with web links and richly adorned with baroque formatting. The small but
growing scientific literature on querulous complainants (e.g., Lester, Wilson, Griffin, & Mullen, 2004; Mullen &
Lester, 2006) sheds light on the nature of the majority of such complaints.
In the case of tobacco research there is also evidence that complaints about academics are not random but
highly organized (Landman & Glantz, 2009). In at least one case known to us (not involving the present authors),
allegations of misconduct to a university rested on the fact that a scientist submitted a commentary critical of an
earlier paper to a journal for peer review—this complaint was not upheld, but the potentially chilling effects on
academic freedom cannot go unnoticed. The triage between such vexatious complaints and legitimate grievances
causes considerable expenditure of public funds, and the development of appropriate institutional procedures
and the consequences of complaints is an area of ongoing research (e.g., Bourne et al., 2015).
Recent evidence has revealed that up to US$1billion flows into foundations and think tanks in the U.S. every year
that are dedicated to political lobbying for various issues. One of the principal objectives of this network is to
support a climate “counter movement” that seeks to reframe public discourse surrounding climate change from
one of overwhelming scientific consensus to one of doubt, debate, and uncertainty (Brulle, 2014; Plehwe, 2014).
To illustrate, more than 90% of recent books that dismiss environmental problems have been linked to conservative
think tanks (Jacques, Dunlap, & Freeman, 2008), and such books typically never undergo peer review (Dunlap
& Jacques, 2013). A recent social network analysis has highlighted the role of “echo chambers” in promulgating
the perception of a scientific debate where in fact there is none (Jasny, Waggle, & Fisher, 2015). The fact that
the contrarian talking points that emanate from this network have little or no scientific validity was recently confirmed
by a blind expert test: Lewandowsky, Ballard, Oberauer, and Benestad (2016) translated climatological data and
their associated contrarian talking points into an economic context and presented them to expert economists for
adjudication. The contrarian interpretations were found to be inappropriate and misleading.
A further target for contrarian activity involves preliminary results or unpublished data. This modus operandi was
also pioneered by the tobacco industry, which campaigned hard to gain unhindered access to epidemiological
data (Baba, Cook, McGarity, & Bero, 2005). At first glance, it might appear paradoxical that an industry would
sponsor laws ostensibly designed to ensure transparency of research. However, access to raw data is necessary
for the re-“analyses” of epidemiological data by entities sympathetic to corporate interests. In the case of tobacco,
those analyses have repeatedly downplayed the link between smoking and lung cancer (e.g., Cataldo, Bero, &
Malone, 2010; Michaels, 2008; Proctor, 2011). Similarly, data published by two of the present authors (M.M. and
S.L.) have been subject to re-“analyses” on internet blogs to attenuate challenging implications of the re-
search—namely, that the warming from greenhouse gas emissions is historically unprecedented (Mann, Bradley,
& Hughes, 1998) and that some of those who oppose this scientific fact tend to engage in conspiratorial discourse
(Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Oberauer, 2013, 2015b; Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Gignac, 2013).
A curious feature of these attacks on scientists is that they tend to be accompanied by public calls for “debate”;
often the same individuals who launch complaints with institutions to silence a scientist are also proclaiming that
they want to enter into a “debate” about the science that they so energetically oppose.
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Public Skepticism and the Scientific Process
In a democracy, calls for genuine debate are to be welcomed and must be taken seriously. Given that scientific
issues can have far-reaching political, technological, or environmental consequences, greater involvement of the
public can only be welcome and may lead to better policy outcome. To illustrate, the historic Yorkshire market
town of Pickering recently revised its flood management plan as a result of a year-long collaboration between the
local public, social scientists, and natural scientists (Whatmore & Landström, 2011). The flood management plan
that was ultimately accepted differed considerably from the initial draft produced by scientists without the local
knowledge that later became available through the public’s input. The success of this “co-production” of knowledge
was arguably manifest during the winter of 2015/2016 when Pickering escaped the severe flooding that gripped
other parts of Yorkshire (Lean, 2016).
Notwithstanding the public’s entitlement to be involved in issues that are scientifically informed, scientific debates
must still be conducted according to the rules of science. Arguments must be evidence-based and they are subject
to peer review before they become provisionally accepted. Arguments or ideas that turn out to be false or imperfect
are eventually discarded or updated—a process that may sometimes seem to take (too) long but that appears to
have served science and society well overall (e.g., Alberts et al., 2015).
Although these strictures may appear rigorous, it is important to recognize that they do not exclude the public
from scientific debate. Unless it can be shown that the public can participate in legitimate scientific debate, the
denialist activities just reviewed might acquire a sheen of legitimacy as the only avenues open to the public to
question scientific findings.
Recently, two of us (H.F. and N.J.L.B.) were co-authors of an article (Brown, Sokal, & Friedman, 2013) that received
much coverage for its criticism of a long-standing, much-cited finding in the field of positive psychology. Positive
psychology studies the strengths that enable individuals to thrive and aims to aid in the achievement of a satisfac-
tory and fulfilling life. At the time when the project that led to our article was started, N.J.L.B., the first author of
that paper, was essentially a stranger to academia, having only attended 3 weeks of a weekend Master’s program
in psychology at the age of 51 while working full-time as an international civil servant. When he doubted the valid-
ity of some of positive psychology’s findings that were presented as fact in his London classroom, he pursued the
issue by contacting a researcher in the U.S. (H.F.) by e-mail based only on the proposition that he might be
sympathetic to his puzzlement. Unsure of the etiquette and politics that might be involved, he found to his surprise
that it was remarkably easy to establish a dialog with senior academics. (Support or advice within his teaching
institution was not immediately available.) Once a dialog with the external expert had been established, and once
N.J.L.B. had convinced his interlocutors of his sincerity (and got over the worst of his own impostor syndrome),
a fruitful scientific collaboration ensued that has thus far led to the publication of five articles (Brown et al., 2013;
Brown, MacDonald, Samanta, Friedman, & Coyne, 2014; Brown, Sokal, & Friedman, 2014a, 2014b; Heathers,
Brown, Coyne, & Friedman, 2015). Notably, this collaboration differs from conventional student-professor interactions
in that the parties initially were not known to each other and had no professional relationship prior to an unsolicited
approach by e-mail.
To be sure, the process of getting the first rebuttal article published was not easy, given the stature of the article
reporting the original, erroneous finding (Fredrickson & Losada, 2005): It was considered one of the cornerstones
of the positive psychology movement and had been cited over 350 times. We encountered a certain amount of
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resistance—which we would mostly qualify as bureaucratic rather than sinister, despite the presence of certain
apparent conflicts of interest—to the acceptance of both our initial rebuttal article (on the basis that it was “too
late” to comment on an article published eight years before), and to our attempts to write a subsequent comment
on the original author’s reply (on the basis that the standard sequence of replies to a target article was now finished).
Ultimately, all articles appeared in print in the same journal (Brown et al., 2013; Brown, Sokal, & Friedman, 2014a,
2014b). A detailed account of the story was provided by Rotondaro (2013).ii
Based on their experiences, the present authors strongly support the “Pottery Barn Rule” (Coyne, 2014)—that is,
the principle that a journal should commit to accepting all relevant scholarly critiques of original work published
in that journal. Had such a principle been a normal part of the publishing process, getting the critiques of the
Fredrickson and Losada (2005) paper through the system would have been somewhat easier. Nevertheless, in
the end, the system worked as it should: everyone remained calm and polite, the various publishing and appeals
processes were tested and observed to work, the scientific record was corrected, the field of positive psychology
took stock, and nobody felt the need to publish anyone’s home address or other personal details on the Internet
(a terrifying process, also known as “doxxing”; e.g., Diresta & Lotan, 2015, that is popular not only with political
operatives who oppose climate science but also with anti-vaccination activists).
However, we acknowledge that for many scientists, particularly those working in contested areas, there can be
a fine line, on the first reading of an initial, unsolicited contact from a lay person, between the dedicated amateur
investigator who might be on to something, and the time-wasting, deluded crank. The first author of this article
once engaged in good-faith correspondence with a person who turned out to be not a person but a “sock puppet”;
that is, an artificial persona controlled by persons unknown who ultimately published the private correspondence
on the internet, presumably with the intent to create embarrassment. Lewandowsky (2011) provided a detailed
account of this episode. The second author has had similar experiences over the years, which are spelled out in
Mann (2012).
The Need for Vigorous Debate
We underscore that there is plenty of room for honest and vigorous debate in science, even among collaborating
authors: One of us (N.J.L.B.) is an enthusiastic proponent of the widespread adoption of genetically-modified or-
ganisms (GMOs) as a way to alleviate global food shortages, whereas two of us (M.M. and S.L.) at least provision-
ally accept the safety of GMOs (EFSA Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms [GMO], 2010; though see Hilbeck
et al., 2015) but are concerned about their indirect consequences, such as the emergence of herbicide-resistant
weeds that has been associated with overuse of herbicides when GMO crops became available that were engi-
neered to be resistant to herbicides (Gilbert, 2013; Mortensen, Egan, Maxwell, Ryan, & Smith, 2012). One of us
(H.F.) is concerned about both their indirect consequences and their potential safety to individuals.
Two of us (H.F. and N.J.L.B.) are not convinced beyond doubt that highly complex climate models are as yet
sufficiently validated to be used as the basis of major public policy decisions that might have effects for many
decades; the other two authors (S.L. and M.M.) acknowledge the uncertainty inherent in climate projections but
note that contrary to popular intuition, any uncertainty provides even greater impetus for climate mitigation
(Freeman, Wagner, & Zeckhauser, 2015; Lewandowsky, Ballard, & Pancost, 2015; Lewandowsky, Risbey,
Smithson, & Newell, 2014; Lewandowsky, Risbey, Smithson, Newell, & Hunter, 2014).
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Notwithstanding those disagreements, the present authors found common ground for this article. We also did not
use freedom-of-information (FOI) requests for each other’s private correspondence, nor would we ever resort to
such means to resolve scientific disagreements with other parties (of which there are many).
We also believe that the public is entitled to participate in scientific debate, and we have presented one case study
that illustrates this possibility. Based on the experience of two of the present authors (N.J.L.B. and H.F.), we have
compiled guidelines in Appendix A for members of the public who wish to contribute to scientific debate and critique
but are unsure how to do so. Based on the experiences of the first two authors (S.L. and M.M.) we have provided
parallel guidelines in Appendix B for researchers who are approached bymembers of the public who wish to engage
in collaboration. Lewandowsky and Bishop (2016) tabled further criteria for the “triage” between scrutiny and ha-
rassment. The appendices can help both sides navigate the dividing line between scrutiny and denial.
Finally, it is important to recognize that although we believe that scientific evidence should inform political debate,
it is no substitute for it. To illustrate, the scientific evidence is fairly clear that the fallout from the Fukushima nuclear
accident poses no discernible risk to people in North America (e.g., Fisher et al., 2013; Norman, Angell, & Chodash,
2011) or globally (e.g., Thakur, Ballard, & Nelson, 2013), but that finding should only guide, and definitely not
preclude, political debate about the safety of nuclear power. Whatever the science may say about the risks of
nuclear power—for example, that it causes 100 times fewer fatalities than renewable biomass (Markandya &
Wilkinson, 2007)—those data might be legitimately overridden by the “dread” that nuclear power evokes in people
(Slovic, 1987). Dread can justify a country’s exit from nuclear power (Jahn & Korolczuk, 2012), although even
dread does not justify threats of physical violence against scientists who measure nuclear fallout (Hume, 2015).
Enhancing the Resilience of the Scientific Enterprise
Opinion surveys regularly and consistently show that public trust in scientists is very high (Hamilton, Hartter, &
Saito, 2015; Mazur, 1977; Pew Research Center, 2015). However, the position of the scientist as the neutral,
disinterested guardian of “the truth,” someone who is above ideological and financial considerations, has been
hard-won and should not be taken for granted. For example, when our above-mentioned article critical of a long-
standing finding in positive psychology (Brown et al., 2013) was published, it was cited on several forums and
blogs dedicated to creationist ideas or to climate-change denial. The argument typically ran thus: If psychologists
can be as badly wrong as Brown et al. showed, and if psychologists are scientists, then how much confidence
can we have in the pronouncements of other scientists? This logic, while severely flawed, does have a certain
appeal to a specific subset of the public; this explains, perhaps, why it forms the basis of many types of populist
political discourse.
While it is certainly possible to refute such logic in reasoned debate, it might be preferable if scientists refrained
from giving provocateurs the opportunity to raise this kind of question in the first place. In this regard, we strongly
support the principles of the Open Science movement (e.g., Nosek & Bar-Anan, 2012; Nosek, Spies, & Motyl,
2012; Nosek et al., 2015). We also rigorously contribute to the self-correction of science wherever necessary:
The experiences of H.F. and N.J.L.B. are self-evidently exemplary in this regard, and where necessary two of the
present authors have engaged in self-correction by publishing a corrigendum although the corrections had no
impact on the conclusions of the respective articles: Lewandowsky, Gignac, and Oberauer (2015a) discovered a
computational error that changed certain values in a table and figure but did not impact the conclusions, and
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Mann, Bradley, and Hughes (2004) corrected the list of data sets that were used in an earlier paper (Mann et al.,
1998), which did not affect the originally-reported results. Indeed, the original result reported by Mann et al. has
been continually refined over the years. The result has been a more robust and definitive conclusion by the scien-
tific community that current global temperatures are unprecedented during the last millennium or more (e.g.,
Masson-Delmotte, Schulz, Abe-Ouchi, Beer, & Ganopolski, 2013; PAGES 2k Consortium, 2013).
Finally, we believe that scientists, in any field, who may be tempted to cut corners in the interest of publishing
something they “know” to be right—perhaps reasoning that the required concessions are only “wafer-thin” (Goldstone
& Jones, 1983)—should consider very carefully the possible consequences of their actions, not only for themselves,
their lab, or their institution, but also for science in general. However flawed some critics or criticisms of science
may be, in the long-run science can flourish only by rigorous correction.
Conclusions
Science is debate. And as we have shown in this article, critical members of the public can partake in this debate.
One of the present authors (N.J.L.B.) was a few weeks into his studies when he commenced a process that ulti-
mately led to the deconstruction of a widely cited paper in psychology. Notably, he pursued avenues within legitimate
scientific channels and his work has been taken seriously by senior colleagues. Being taken seriously is not an
entitlement but a privilege that needs to be earned by participating in scientific debate by acting scientifically. We
have shown that skeptics, whatever their background, can enter into this debate (see Appendix A for specific
guidelines).
People who deny scientific facts that they find challenging or unacceptable, by contrast, are by and large not
skeptics. On the contrary, they demonstrably shy away from scientific debate by avoiding the submission of their
ideas to peer review. Instead, the discursive activity of those individuals is largely limited to blogs and the media,
accompanied by complaints to institutions and journals which can have no purpose other than to stifle, rather than
promote, scientific debate.
There is a growing body of scholarly literature in the climate arena which suggests that the aggressive efforts by
contrarians have not only had a generally chilling effect on the academic community but have also adversely af-
fected the communication and even the direction of research itself (Brysse, Oreskes, O’Reilly, & Oppenheimer,
2013; Freudenburg & Muselli, 2010; Lewandowsky, Oreskes, Risbey, Newell, & Smithson, 2015). For example,
in a quantitative analysis of media coverage, Freudenburg and Muselli (2010) showed that the vast majority of
findings that were reported subsequent to the last report of the U.N.’s panel on climate change (IPCC) revealed
the climate to be changing faster than predicted. Rahmstorf et al. (2007) came to similar conclusions in their
comparison of observations to projections. Freudenburg and Muselli suggested that the conservatism of the IPCC
was the result of the continued asymmetry of challenge, whereby any “alarmist” prediction—even if amply justi-
fied—is pounced upon with vigorous critique and denial, whereas “harmless” projections are met with less hostil-
ity by contrarians. Brysse et al. (2013) came to similar conclusions, and Lewandowsky, Oreskes, et al. (2015)
analyzed the underlying psychological mechanisms that make the “seepage” of contrarian memes into mainstream
science difficult to prevent.
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We suggest that the scientific community should respond to legitimate skepticism and politically-motivated denial
with a three-pronged approach (see Appendix B): First, legitimate public concern about a lack of transparency
and questionable research practices must be met by ensuring that research lives up to modern standards. We
endorse most current efforts in this regard and one of us (S.L.) is a member of a relevant initiative involving the
use of peer review to enforce openness (https://opennessinitiative.org/; Morey et al., 2015).
Second, we believe that daylight is the best protection against politically-motivated maneuverings to undermine
science. The first part of this article is one effort towards such transparency, and we hope that it provides editors
and university administrators with the necessary understanding of the background and common strategies of attack
with which scientists across multiple disciplines are targeted (see also Lewandowsky & Bishop, 2016).
Finally, skeptical members of the public must be given the opportunity to engage in scientific debate: We have
shown how two of the present authors—an academic and a member of the public who had been to three evening
classes before his skepticism was aroused—teamed up to critique a widely-cited finding and showed it to be un-
supportable. None of their activities fell within the strategies and techniques of denial that we reviewed at the
outset, clarifying that denial is not an “avenue of last resort” for members of the public who are desperate to con-
tribute to science or even correct it, but a politically-motivated effort to undermine science.
Notes
i) A detailed analysis of how conspiracist discourse and cognition differs from conventional scientific reasoning was provided
by Lewandowsky, Cook, et al. (2015).
ii) It could be suggested that the situation of N.J.L.B at the time was more akin to that of a regular graduate student who is
expected to conduct research under supervision. This suggestion is inappropriate given the particulars of the situation (e.g.,
evening course, no supervisor-student research arrangements, no research infrastructure or support by the host institution).
The one advantage open to N.J.L.B. at the time was access to a university library; however, most university libraries known
to us around the world permit members of the public to subscribe for a modest fee.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Proposed Guidelines for Critical Scientific Engagement by Members of the Public
Jane Q. Public believes to have discovered an error in Dr. A’s work, or she has an alternative account of a previously published
finding, or an original idea suitable for publication. The research area is highly contested. How should Ms. Public proceed?
0. Preamble: recognize the scientific process
If your goal is to contribute to a scientific conversation, then you need to follow certain rules. One of those rules is that scien-
tific arguments are conducted in the scientific peer-reviewed literature. If you are unwilling to do so, these guidelines are of
little value.
1. Build alliances
Journal editors receive articles from "outsiders" all the time; these outsiders are called "graduate students." Apart from having
a university affiliation, beginning graduate students have little advantage over Ms. Jane Q. Public when it comes to having
their work considered by editors. Graduate students do, however, benefit from having their supervisor's name on the paper,
which serves as an indicator of at least a minimum level of credibility of the submission.
Likewise, you will find it much easier to get your ideas taken seriously if you can introduce them, at least for your first publication,
with the support of an established scientist—especially because your first submission is likely to leave considerable room for
improvement by a "critical friend."
If you cannot find an ally within academia despite trying repeatedly, you should entertain the possibility that your ideas may
not be quite as brilliant as you first thought.
2. Safeguard your appearance
While scientists welcome correspondence from almost anybody, their willingness to continue a conversation will depend at
least partly on what they are getting out of it. Most researchers, especially those working in controversial areas, have developed
an ability to detect the difference between an approach based on a genuine desire to understand their field, and one that ulti-
mately is just intended to discredit some piece of research or extract information that can be turned against a particular scientist.
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As an outsider, no matter how brilliant your idea, you will need to put it forward using the language and the formalities of science;
trying to make out that your ideas are beyond such niceties will not help your credibility. Nobody ought to look down on your
ideas merely because of your lack of experience. Presenting them appropriately will help to ensure that they are considered
and, depending on their merit, robustly questioned.
3. Unless it is unavoidable, avoid questioning researchers' motives
Scientists are required to declare any competing interests in their publications so that external observers can take those
competing interests into account.
The fact that a researcher performs consulting work for a pharmaceutical manufacturer must not be hidden or ignored when
evaluating her article describing the favorable trial outcome for a new drug from that company; however, corporate funding
does not prevent a drug from being an improvement over its predecessors. (Undeclared conflicts of interest are another matter;
alert citizens can sometimes play an important part in bringing these to light.)
Scientists are human and can be expected to behave in normal human ways most of the time. Very occasionally one may
encounter a form of unethical or corrupt behavior, but in the vast majority of cases, scientists are essentially honest people
trying to make their way in an imperfect world where things do not always go according to plan. Science as a career choice
is not exempt from the laws of workplace economics and sociology (a fact that scientists themselves might do well to acknowl-
edge more often). Thus, if you discover presumed errors in a scientist's work, the working assumption should be that if the
errors are real, they were made accidentally and not in pursuit of some nefarious agenda.
4. Accept that everyone makes mistakes
All scientific results are provisional, and somemay be shown to be incorrect, with each new result hopefully making incremental
progress towards a better approximation to the truth. Unfortunately, this does not prevent the occurrence of errors, which are
a—hopefully—infrequent but inevitable by-product of scientific work.
While the reactions of researchers to being informed about flaws in their work are not always quite as helpful and collegial as
they should be, science ultimately does self-correct, even if this is sometimes in the form of the de facto abandonment of a
theory rather than any formal renunciation of it by its most earnest proponents.
For the person who brings bad news (by detecting errors or flaws in established science), it follows that the potential for success
is greater if the critique is formulated in a constructive way that enables the scientific community to go along with a new way
of looking at things.
5. Carefully examine and control the politics
Many people become interested in a scientific topic because they are concerned about its political implications. But the definition
of "political" is itself contested. For example, Daniel Kahneman has recommended that scientists should be scrupulously
avoiding the political, saying that if science involves a matter "that anybody in Congress is going to be offended by, then it's
political" (cited in Basken, 2016). By that broad definition, evolutionary biology, climate science, and much medical research
would be political and hence off limits. Indeed, given the number of congressional districts and the diversity among Represen-
tatives, Kahneman's criterion might disallow nearly all contemporary science. We therefore adopt a different stance and suggest
that politics need not be a barrier to engagement: the fact that smoking causes lung cancer may have political consequences
but that must not deter medical researchers. Nonetheless, you should examine very carefully whether the only reason you
believe that something is true is because it corresponds with your worldview. If so, you might want to think twice before taking
it to the court of science.
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Although you will surely find some researchers who agree with you on political matters, and who might champion your cause
for that reason, ultimately you will not convince a majority of disinterested scientists of the merits of your argument merely
because it would make for a nicer world if it were true.
6. Be patient
As a rule, science moves slowly. It can be hard for outsiders to reconcile themselves to the apparently glacial pace of the
publication process. It is not uncommon for a year or more to elapse between submission and publication.
While there are sometimes political reasons for such delays—especially if the article is critical of previously published work—it
is often simply a matter of the review process taking time. If your work is critical of established science, it may require more
than one submission to find a journal that is willing to accept your paper.
In most cases, the rejections along the way will help improve your work, especially if the reviews were negative (so long as
they are detailed), because your paper will become increasingly bullet proof the more opportunity you have had to respond
to adversarial comments.
However, if you get flat rejections without the paper going out for review, or if all reviewers are uniformly scathing in their
judgment, then you may eventually want to reconsider whether your idea is really as meritorious as it first appeared to be.
Appendix B: Proposed Guidelines for Researchers who Are Approached by a Member of the
Public Seeking Critical Engagement
Dr. John Q. Researcher is approached by a member of the public who has discovered an error in his work, or presumes that
there is an error in it, and seeks access to the data. The research area is highly contested. How should Dr. Researcher respond?
0. Preamble: recognize the public’s right to be involved
Science in the public interest deserves public scrutiny. Science is meant to be transparent and subject to self-correction, and
members of the public may well detect errors in one’s work. Research data and procedures should therefore generally and
wherever possible be in the public domain and freely accessible by anyone.
1. Build rapport
Polite enquiries from the public deserve a polite response. Scientists should assume that a constructive dialogue with an inter-
locutor is possible. We believe that most members of the public who approach a researcher do so with the intention of con-
structive dialogue.
2. Safeguard your appearance
Researchers can take several simple safeguards to minimize risks. Researchers should not provide any materials in private
correspondence with the interlocutor that they would not be willing to provide to the public at large. The assumption should
be that all correspondence may become public in one way or another.
Researchers should also recognize that some interlocutors may be acting in bad faith and are “trolling” (i.e., behave in a “de-
ceptive, destructive, or disruptive manner in a social setting on the Internet with no apparent instrumental purpose”; Buckels,
Trapnell, & Paulhus, 2014, p. 97). Because engagement with critics is a core element of science, researchers may feel obliged
to respond even to trolls. Trolling has been associated with sadism and psychopathy (Buckels et al., 2014), and scientists
should guard against engagement with such individuals.
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3. Unless it is unavoidable, avoid questioning the requestor’s motives
Scientists should assume that requests for data or clarification are made in good faith and are reasonable. Scientists should
also generally not be concerned about the motives of the requestor as simple disagreement must not preclude access to data.
There are, however, exceptions that involve considerations of privacy when medical or behavioral data are involved (e.g.,
Lewandowsky & Bishop, 2016). For that reason, the ethics code of the American Psychological Association (Sec. 8.14 a)
stipulates that data be released to “other competent professionals” (http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/index.aspx). Similarly, the
U.K. Medical Research Council’s guidelines state that “The custodian [of the data] must ensure that the group [receiving the
data] accepts a duty of confidence and protects confidentiality through training procedures, etc, to the same standards as the
custodian” (https://www.mrc.ac.uk/documents/pdf/personal-information-in-medical-research/).
It follows that the motives and competence of the requestor do matter in some circumstances. Determining when those circum-
stances apply is non-trivial and merits further research (e.g., Sydes et al., 2015).
4. Boundaries of transparency
Although most requests for data are reasonable and made in good faith, there are instances when this does not apply. For
example, persistent requests for as-yet unpublished data, draft manuscripts, or personal correspondence of any sort is more
likely to be vexatious than a good-faith effort to advance science.
The triage between the reasonable and unreasonable is difficult but some proposals have been put forward (Lewandowsky
& Bishop, 2016; Sydes et al., 2015).
5. Carefully examine and control the politics
Although the requestor’s motives generally should not matter in determining data access, it is important for researchers to
understand why their work is being scrutinized. The motives (and techniques) of the tobacco industry when reanalyzing epi-
demiological data may diverge from those of the original researchers (Baba et al., 2005; Cataldo et al., 2010). Knowledge of
motivation can be helpful in anticipating what a requestor’s likely intentions are.
Some scientists feel passionately about the political implications of their research. It is important to be aware of one’s feelings
and politics, and how they might impact one’s attitudes towards an interlocutor. One should examine very carefully whether
the only reason you believe that something is true is because it corresponds with your worldview. Just because an interlocutor
has a different worldview must not prevent them getting access to data.
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